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VEX

An SBOM lists what a product contains; matched against vulnerability databases, it yields every vulnerability of every component. Most do not affect the product: the vulnerable function is never called, the feature is not compiled in, the attack needs a configuration nobody uses. A customer or an auditor who receives the SBOM finds the same long list and cannot tell.

VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) is the answer to that list: a statement, per vulnerability and component, of whether the product is affected, and why not when it is not. In CycloneDX, it is the analysis of each entry of vulnerabilities: a state (not_affected, exploitable, in_triage, resolved…), a justification for not_affected, and free text.

Why it matters now

Customers increasingly ask for one, and regulation is following. The EU Cyber Resilience Act requires manufacturers of products with digital elements to identify and document the components and vulnerabilities of their products, with an SBOM, and to handle vulnerabilities without delay. A VEX document is the usual way to show that handling for each vulnerability the SBOM reveals, in a form tools can read.

What nanobom says, and what it does not

nanobom’s triage already holds the information: an ignored finding has a reason. What a reason lacks is a form a machine can read, and a distinction between “does not affect us” and “we accept the risk”. Hence the justification of an ignore, from the CycloneDX vocabulary, and these choices in exports:

  • Only a justification makes a not_affected. An ignore with just a reason is often an accepted risk or a postponed fix. Telling a customer it does not affect the product would be a claim nobody made, so it is exported as in_triage, with the reason as detail.
  • Open is in_triage, never exploitable. nanobom knows when a vulnerability is exploited in the wild (CISA KEV), not whether this product exposes it. Being exploited somewhere does not make it exploitable here, and stating exploitable would be as unfounded as stating not_affected.
  • Fixed is resolved. A fixed finding’s component is often gone or upgraded, so the statement is about a version the product no longer contains. It stays in the document as the record of what was handled.
  • False positive is kept apart. CycloneDX has a false_positive state for a vulnerability wrongly associated with a component. nanobom offers it alongside the justifications so an ignore can say it, and an import of false_positive round-trips.

Importing statements

Imports turn others’ statements, or your own kept in a repository, into ignores, so the same decision is not made twice and the CI gate stops failing on what was already analysed. Only not_affected and false_positive act; the other states inform and change nothing, since reopening or prioritizing a finding on someone else’s word is a decision for a member.

Matching is deliberately strict. A statement must name the vulnerability (by any alias) and the component’s exact version: a statement written for lodash 4.17.20 says nothing about 4.17.21, which may contain other code. Version ranges (affects[].versions) are not read for the same reason.

An import is attributed to the upload token that sent it, not to a person: tokens are how CI acts, and whoever reads the history sees where the decision came from. Restoring an imported ignore works as for any other; a later import of the same statement ignores the finding again, so fix the statement rather than the finding.

Limits

  • CycloneDX only. OpenVEX, CSAF VEX and SPDX security information are not read or written. OpenVEX describes the same idea with other justifications (vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path, inline_mitigations_already_exist…) that map only partly onto CycloneDX’s; nanobom is CycloneDX-native throughout, so it stays with one vocabulary rather than translate lossily. Converters exist between the formats.
  • The export describes the current state of the project, with the findings of its latest SBOM; nanobom keeps no history of exports or per-release VEX documents.
  • References to elements of another document (BOM-Links whose fragment is a bom-ref rather than a package URL) cannot be resolved, since nanobom does not keep the bom-refs of uploaded SBOMs.
  • Responses (can_not_fix, update…) and affects[].versions are neither read nor written.